Readings

Unit 4

• Introduction—Civil Liberties: Safeguarding the Individual
• Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*: “Effects of the Tyranny of the Majority Upon the National Character of the Americans—The Courtier Spirit in the United States”
• Locke, “An Essay Concerning the True Original,Extent, and End of Civil Government”
• Mill, “On Liberty”
• Thoreau, “Civil Disobedience”

Questions

1. In what ways, according to Tocqueville, do democracies exercise despotism over the minds of men?
2. What did Locke make of the argument that Adam had a natural dominance over his children?
3. According to Mill, how far should the liberty of the individual be limited?
4. How did Thoreau believe that most men serve the state?
Introduction—Civil Liberties: Safeguarding the Individual

Unimaginably old but surprisingly new, civil liberties have become central to American perceptions of what it is to be an individual as well as an American. The ability to be left alone with your beliefs, opinions, and actions may be as old as Achilles but has certainly reached new importance in the twentieth century. It has also contributed to, as Tocqueville predicted, new difficulties. In a democratic society people necessarily become more skeptical of the beliefs of their neighbors but more reliant on the beliefs of the “public.”

In the United States, the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the use of individuals, who are thus relieved from the necessity of forming opinions of their own. Everybody there adopts great numbers of theories, on philosophy, morals, and politics, without inquiry, upon public trust; and if we examine it very closely, it will be perceived that religion itself holds sway there much less as a doctrine of revelation than as a commonly received opinion.

Democracy, Tocqueville supposed, presented new challenges for individualism, particularly through the threat of mass culture overwhelming individual tastes, opinions, and ideas, even as it presented important possibilities.

The readings collected here offer significant background information on the growth and development of notions of individualism. John Locke’s and John Stuart Mill’s are standard texts on liberty and individual freedom. They attempt to explain why people should be left alone in their own personal choices and to explicate the powerful, sometime supreme role of the individual in political society.

These selections are made more complex with the addition of a reading not normally taken to be about abstract liberty—that of Henry David Thoreau. This piece provides substance and context for the writings of Locke and Mill. That is, it explores the backgrounds, costs, and responsibilities of liberties in very specific contexts. While Thoreau’s piece is not one of his more naturalist writings, it does suggest some meanings of the natural world for Thoreau that bear an interesting relationship to the role of the land in the writings of Jefferson (The Declaration of Independence) and Locke.

All of these selections explore the background and foreground of Tocqueville’s claim that liberty, especially of opinion, experienced numerous challenges in the United States. The readings chosen from earlier sources expound a more natural source of individual interests and ideas. The later readings often deal more explicitly with the challenges presented to individualism—individualism is a struggle and a goal, not a given.
Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*: “Effects of the Tyranny of the Majority Upon the National Character of the Americans—The Courtier Spirit in the United States”

In “Unlimited Power of the Majority in the United States, and Its Consequences” (Volume I, Chapter XV)

**POWER EXERCISED BY THE MAJORITY IN AMERICA UPON OPINION.**

In America, when the majority has once irrevocably decided a question, all discussion ceases—Reason for this—Moral power exercised by the majority upon opinion—Democratic republics have applied despotism to the minds of men.

IT is in the examination of the exercise of thought in the United States that we clearly perceive how far the power of the majority surpasses all the powers with which we are acquainted in Europe. Thought is an invisible and subtle power that mocks all the efforts of tyranny. At the present time the most absolute monarchs in Europe cannot prevent certain opinions hostile to their authority from circulating in secret through their dominions and even in their courts. It is not so in America; as long as the majority is still undecided, discussion is carried on; but as soon as its decision is irrevocably pronounced, everyone is silent, and the friends as well as the opponents of the measure unite in assenting to its propriety. The reason for this is perfectly clear: no monarch is so absolute as to combine all the powers of society in his own hands and to conquer all opposition, as a majority is able to do, which has the right both of making and of executing the laws.

The authority of a king is physical and controls the actions of men without subduing their will. But the majority possesses a power that is physical and moral at the same time, which acts upon the will as much as upon the actions and represses not only all contest, but all controversy.

I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. In any constitutional state in Europe every sort of religious and political theory may be freely preached and disseminated; for there is no country in Europe so subdued by any single authority as not to protect the man who raises his voice in the cause of truth from the consequences of his hardihood. If he is unfortunate enough to live under an absolute government, the people are often on his side; if he inhabits a free country, he can, if necessary, find a shelter behind the throne. The aristocratic part of society supports him in some countries, and the democracy in others. But in a nation where democratic institutions exist, organized like those of the United States, there is but one authority, one element of strength and success, with nothing beyond it.

In America the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion; within these barriers an author may write what he pleases, but woe to him if he goes beyond them. Not that he is in danger of an auto-da-fé, but he is exposed to continued obloquy and persecution. His political career is closed forever, since he has offended the only authority that is able to open it. Every sort of compensation, even that of celebrity, is refused to him. Before making public his opinions he thought he had sympathizers; now it seems to him that he has none any more since he has revealed himself to everyone; then those who blame him criticize loudly and those who think as he does keep quiet and move away without courage. He yields at length, overcome by the daily effort which he has to make, and subsides into silence, as if he felt remorse for having spoken the truth.

Fetters and headsmen were the coarse instruments that tyranny formerly employed; but the civilization of our age has perfected despotism itself, though it seemed to have nothing to learn. Monarchs had, so to speak, materialized oppression; the democratic republics of the present day have rendered it as entirely an affair of the mind as the will, which is intended to coerce. Under the absolute sway of one man the body was attacked in order to subdue the soul; but the soul escaped the blows which were directed against it and rose proudly superior. Such is not the course adopted by tyranny in democratic republics; there the body is left free, and the soul is enslaved. The master no longer says: “You shall think as I do or you shall die”; but he says: “You are free to think differently from me and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but you are henceforth a stranger among your people. You may retain your civil rights, but they will be useless to you, for you will never be chosen by your fellow citizens if you solicit their votes; and they will affect to scorn you if you ask for their esteem. You will remain among men, but you will be deprived of the rights of mankind. Your fellow creatures will shun you like an impure being; and even those who believe in your innocence will abandon you, lest they should be shunned in their turn.”
Effects of the Tyranny of the Majority Upon the National Character of the Americans, cont’d.

Go in peace! I have given you your life, but it is an existence worse than death."

Absolute monarchies had dishonored despotism; let us beware lest democratic republics should reinstate it and render it less odious and degrading in the eyes of the many by making it still more onerous to the few.

Works have been published in the proudest nations of the Old World expressly intended to censure the vices and the follies of the times: Labruyre inhabited the palace of Louis XIV when he composed his chapter upon the Great, and Molière criticized the courtiers in the plays that were acted before the court. But the ruling power in the United States is not to be made game of. The smallest reproach irritates its sensibility, and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant, from the forms of its language up to the solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape paying this tribute of adulation to his fellow citizens. The majority lives in the perpetual utterance of self-applause, and there are certain truths which the Americans can learn only from strangers or from experience.

If America has not as yet had any great writers, the reason is given in these facts; there can be no literary genius without freedom of opinion, and freedom of opinion does not exist in America. The Inquisition has never been able to prevent a vast number of anti-religious books from circulating in Spain. The empire of the majority succeeds much better in the United States, since it actually removes any wish to publish them. Unbelievers are to be met with in America, but there is no public organ of infidelity. Attempts have been made by some governments to protect morality by prohibiting licentious books. In the United States no one is punished for this sort of books, but no one is induced to write them; not because all the citizens are immaculate in conduct, but because the majority of the community is decent and orderly.

In this case the use of the power is unquestionably good; and I am discussing the nature of the power itself. This irresistibible authority is a constant fact, and its judicious exercise is only an accident.


Effects of the tyranny of the majority more sensibly felt hitherto on the manners than on the conduct of society—They check the development of great characters—Democratic republics, organized like the United States, infuse the courtier spirit into the mass of the people—Proofs of this spirit in the United States—Why there is more patriotism in the people than in those who govern in their name.

THE tendencies that I have just mentioned are as yet but slightly perceptible in political society, but they already exercise an unfavorable influence upon the national character of the Americans. I attribute the small number of distinguished men in political life to the ever increasing despotism of the majority in the United States.

When the American Revolution broke out, they arose in great numbers; for public opinion then served, not to tyrannize over, but to direct the exertions of individuals. Those celebrated men, sharing the agitation of mind common at that period, had a grandeur peculiar to themselves, which was reflected back upon the nation, but was by no means borrowed from it.

In absolute governments the great nobles who are nearest to the throne flatter the passions of the sovereign and voluntarily truckle to his caprices. But the mass of the nation does not degrade itself by servitude; it often submits from weakness, from habit, or from ignorance, and sometimes from loyalty. Some nations have been known to sacrifice their own desires to those of the sovereign with pleasure and pride, thus exhibiting a sort of independence of mind in the very act of submission. These nations are miserable, but they are not degraded. There is a great difference between doing what one does not approve, and feigning to approve what one does; the one is the weakness of a feeble person, the other befits the temper of a lackey.

In free countries, where everyone is more or less called upon to give his opinion on affairs of state, in democratic republics, where public life is incessantly mingled with domestic affairs, where the sovereign authority is accessible on every side, and where its attention can always be attracted by vociferation, more persons are to be met with who speculate upon its weaknesses and live upon ministering to its passions than in absolute monarchies. Not because men are naturally worse in these states than elsewhere, but the temptation is stronger and at the same time of easier access. The result is a more extensive debasement of character.
Democratic republics extend the practice of currying favor with the many and introduce it into all classes at once; this is the most serious reproach that can be addressed to them. This is especially true in democratic states organized like the American republics, where the power of the majority is so absolute and irresistible that one must give up one's rights as a citizen and almost abjure one's qualities as a man if one intends to stray from the track which it prescribes.

In that immense crowd which throngs the avenues to power in the United States, I found very few men who displayed that manly candor and masculine independence of opinion which frequently distinguished the Americans in former times, and which constitutes the leading feature in distinguished characters wherever they may be found. It seems at first sight as if all the minds of the Americans were formed upon one model, so accurately do they follow the same route. A stranger does, indeed, sometimes meet with Americans who dissent from the rigor of these formulas, with men who deplore the defects of the laws, the mutability and the ignorance of democracy, who even go so far as to observe the evil tendencies that impair the national character, and to point out such remedies as it might be possible to apply; but no one is there to hear them except yourself, and you, to whom these secret reflections are confided, are a stranger and a bird of passage. They are very ready to communicate truths which are useless to you, but they hold a different language in public.

If these lines are ever read in America, I am well assured of two things: in the first place, that all who peruse them will raise their voices to condemn me; and, in the second place, that many of them will acquit me at the bottom of their conscience.

I have heard of patriotism in the United States, and I have found true patriotism among the people, but never among the leaders of the people. This may be explained by analogy: despotism debases the oppressed much more than the oppressor: in absolute monarchies the king often has great virtues, but the courtiers are invariably servile. It is true that American courtiers do not say “Sire,” or “Your Majesty,” a distinction without a difference. They are forever talking of the natural intelligence of the people whom they serve; they do not debate the question which of the virtues of their master is pre-eminently worthy of admiration, for they assure him that he possesses all the virtues without having acquired them, or without caring to acquire them; they do not give him their daughters and their wives to be raised at his pleasure to the rank of his concubines; but by sacrificing their opinions they prostitute themselves. Moralists and philosophers in America are not obliged to conceal their opinions under the veil of allegory; but before they venture upon a harsh truth, they say: “We are aware that the people whom we are addressing are too superior to the weaknesses of human nature to lose the command of their temper for an instant. We should not hold this language if we were not speaking to men whom their virtues and their intelligence render more worthy of freedom than all the rest of the world.” The sycophants of Louis XIV could not flatter more dexterously.

For my part, I am persuaded that in all governments, whatever their nature may be, servility will cower to force, and adulation will follow power. The only means of preventing men from degrading themselves is to invest no one with that unlimited authority which is the sure method of debasing them.
John Locke, “An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government” (Book 2, Chapters 1-2)

The state of nature—the time before people entered into society—served both Hobbes and John Locke (1632-1704) as a narrative to clarify exactly what people gained or lost when they entered into society. For Hobbes the state of nature was particularly grim; for Locke people were happy and the time was characterized by rationality and tolerance. Locke was born in England in 1632. Locke’s father, an attorney who collected taxes from seaport towns, wanted his son to become a minister. Locke rejected this attention to the spiritual health and instead focused on medicine. As a student of John Owen at Oxford University Locke was introduced to the idea of religious freedom and tolerance. All sides, Locke believed, had the right to be heard. Moreover, he felt that all conflict could be solved if the two groups could settle their differences by seeking a middle ground and compromise. Throughout his writings, Locke maintained that through the use of their reason, or the ability to think, people had the natural ability to govern themselves. Governments were formed, according to Locke, to protect the right to life, liberty, and property. These absolute rights belonged to all the people and if any government abused these rights instead of protecting them, then the people had the right to rebel and form a new government.

An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government
by John Locke, 1690

Book 2, Chapter 1

Of Political Power

1. It having been shown in the foregoing discourse:

Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended.

Secondly. That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.

Thirdly. That if his heirs had, there being no law of Nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined.

Fourthly. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam’s posterity being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance.

All these promises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power,”Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction”; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against), must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be political power. That the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another, and show the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.
Chapter 2

Of the State of Nature

4. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

5. This equality of men by Nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are:

"The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves, for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak, being of one and the same nature: to have anything offered them repugnant to this desire must needs, in all respects, grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them; my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant." (Eccl. Pol. i.)

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence; though man in that state have an uncontrolable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another’s pleasure. And, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us as that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man’s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.

8. And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to
his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons
why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of
Nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that
measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security, and so he becomes dangerous to mankind;
the tie which is to secure them from injury and violence being slighted and broken by him, which being a trespas-
pass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of Nature, every man upon
this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy
things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one who hath transgressed that law, as may make him
repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example, others from doing the like mischief. And in this
case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of
Nature.

9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men; but before they condemn it, I desire them
to resolve me by what right any prince or state can put to death or punish an alien for any crime he commits in
their country? It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legis-
lation, reach not a stranger. They speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legisla-
tive authority by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth hath no power over him. Those
who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France, or Holland are, to an Indian, but like the rest of
the world- men without authority. And therefore, if by the law of Nature every man hath not a power to punish
offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can
punish an alien of another country, since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man
naturally may have over another.

10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the laws, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a
man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature and to be a noxious
creature, there is commonly injury done, and some person or other, some other man, receives damage by his
transgression; in which case, he who hath received any damage has (besides the right of punishment common to
him, with other men) a particular right to seek reparation from him that hath done it. And any other person who
finds it just may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may
make satisfaction for the harm he hath suffered.

11. From these two distinct rights (the one of punishing the crime, for restraint and preventing the like offence,
which right of punishing is in everybody, the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party)
comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his
hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal
offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has
received. That he who hath suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit.
The damned person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender by right of
self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent its being committed again, by the right
he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end. And thus it is that
every man in the state of Nature has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury
(which no reparation can compensate) by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody, and also
to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God
hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with
whom men can have no society nor security. And upon this is grounded that great law of nature, “Whoso shed-
deth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.” And Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to
destroy such a criminal, that, after the murder of his brother, he cries out, “Every one that findeth me shall slay me,”
so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

12. By the same reason may a man in the state of Nature punish the lesser breaches of that law, it will, perhaps, be
demanded, with death? I answer: Each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity,
as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the
like. Every offence that can be committed in the state of Nature may, in the state of Nature, be also punished
equally, and as far forth, as it may, in a commonwealth. For though it would be beside my present purpose to enter
here into the particulars of the law of Nature, or its measures of punishment, yet it is certain there is such a law,
and that too as intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive laws of com-
monwealths, nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and intricate con-
trivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for truly so are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right as they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

13. To this strange doctrine—viz., That in the state of Nature every one has the executive power of the law of Nature—I doubt not but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends; and, on the other side, ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others, and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of Nature, which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it. But I shall desire those who make this objection to remember that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils which necessarily follow from men being judges in their own cases, and the state of Nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of Nature, where one man commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases without the least question or control of those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted to? which men in the state of Nature are not bound to do one to another. And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were, there any men in such a state of Nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of “independent” governments all through the world are in a state of Nature, it is plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of “independent” communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others; for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of Nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises and compacts men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of Nature. The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men in Soldania, in or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of Nature in reference to one another for truth, and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.

15. To those that say there were never any men in the state of Nature, I will not oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol. i. 10), where he says, “the laws which have been hitherto mentioned”—i.e., the laws of Nature—“do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do; but for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our Nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man, therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves as first in politic societies.” But I, moreover, affirm that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their own consents, they make themselves members of some politic society, and I doubt not, in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” (Chapter III)

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), was born the eldest son of James Mill in London on May 20, 1806. His father directed his early life and education—removing him from interactions with children his age—with a very firm hand and eye to raising him in the image of the disinterested utilitarian scholar. John Mill was not, however, shielded from Jeremy Bentham; Bentham's utilitarianism would be the primary focus of the young man's life. When he turned 21, however, things changed; the objects and desires that had given his early life meaning seemed exhausted. He lost interest and enthusiasm. But as the months slowly passed, he rediscovered his emotion, at least in part because he discovered the emotions of a Mrs. Taylor. This relationship became remarkable productive for both—they co-authored many essays in the course of a long friendship. After the death of her husband they were married in 1851. One of his many short and various pieces of writing, the essay “On Liberty” puts forward the thesis “that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.” Mill articulates a strong argument for liberalism—for leaving people alone with their business and their privacies. Freedom of speech is an important support for Mill's argument because of its fundamental importance for independent thought—the most important element of individual freedom; exactly, it should be pointed out, what Tocqueville believed to be most absent from America.

On Liberty
Chapter III
On Individuality, As One of the Elements of Wellbeing

SUCH being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corndealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a coordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil
On Liberty, cont’d.

is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic
worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they
now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good
enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social
reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the gen-
eral acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind. Few persons,
out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both
as a savant and as a politician, made the text of a treatise—that “the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the
eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and
most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;” that, therefore, the object
“towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design
to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;” that for
this there are two requisites, “freedom, and a variety of situations;” and that from the union of these arise “indi-
nual vigor and manifold diversity,” which combine themselves in “originality.”[1]

Little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Von Humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them
to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree.
No one’s idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would
assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress what-
ever of their own judgment, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that
people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had
as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody
denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of
human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties,
to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly
applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent,
evidence of what their experience has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to this deference:
but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their
interpretation of experience may be correct but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and
customary characters: and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both
good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him
any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judg-
ment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who
does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what
is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into
no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe
it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but
is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his
own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others are not concerned), it is so much done towards ren-
dering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic.

He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty
than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to
decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities
he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his
own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out
of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is
of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man,
which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself.
Supposing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches
erected and prayers said, by machinery—by automats in human form—it would be a considerable loss to
exchange for these automats even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilized parts of the
world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a
machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to
grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.
It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to coexist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connection is the other way. To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures—is not the better for containing many persons who have much character—and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.

But if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. "Pagan selfassertion" is one of the elements of human worth, as well as "Christian self-denial." There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox.

It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to
On Liberty, cont’d.

posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists under it; and whatever
 crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes to be enforcing
the will of God or the injunctions of men.

Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individu-
ality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what
more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer
to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this?
Doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is
necessary further to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped—to point
out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible
manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance.

I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time
appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action, and disregard of custom
are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs
more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who
have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existences should be
constructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of
common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in
itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably
alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure, or he has
a whole warehouseful to choose from: and it is easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings
more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet? If it were
only that people have diversities of taste that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one
model. But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more
exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical atmosphere and climate.
The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to
another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment
in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burden, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are
the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on
them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life,
they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which
their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to
tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their society.

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract
in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for
the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a cer-
tain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered
as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors
and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions
society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society
may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare,
without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by
opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,
society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by inter-
fering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a
person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all
the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there
should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

But with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to
society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any
assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the
greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I
would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of
rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue
the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational con-
duct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it. Society
has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of
childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. The existing
generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot
indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom;
and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make
the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerable number
of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives,
society has itself to blame for the consequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the
ascendancy which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to
judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who
incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this,
the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all prin-
ciples of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor is there
anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct, than a resort to the
worse. If there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of the material
of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such
person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from
injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such
usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness
which succeeded, in the time of Charles II, to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what
is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indul-
gen; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others
with impunity to the wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others,
is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this, can think other-
wise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct,
it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed
to be in all or most cases attendant on it.

Under the name of preventing intemperance the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United
States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical pur-
poses: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And though the imprac-
ticality of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it, including the
one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with
considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. The associ-
ation, or “Alliance” as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through
the publicity given to a correspondence between its Secretary and one of the very few English public men who
hold that a politician’s opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley’s share in this correspondence is
calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are man-
ifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those who figure in political life. The organ of the
Alliance, who would “deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry
and persecution,” undertakes to point out the “broad and impassable barrier” which divides such principles from
those of the association. “All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me,” he says, “to be
without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power
vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it.” No mention is made of a third class, different
from either of these, viz., acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that
the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a
social act. But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and con-
sumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to
obtain it. The Secretary, however, says, “I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are
invaded by the social act of another.” And now for the definition of these “social rights.” “If anything invades my
social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly cre-
ating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a
misery, I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my
path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and
On Liberty, cont’d.

intercourse.” A theory of “social rights,” the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language—being nothing short of this—that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them; for the moment an opinion which I consider noxious, passes any one’s lips, it invades all the “social rights” attributed to me by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other’s moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.

I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion, founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practiced by persons who speak English, and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognize such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. A recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words,) not a crusade, but a civilizade, against this polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilization. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means, (of which silencing the teachers is not one,) oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. If civilization has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilization. A civilization that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit, the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.
On Liberty, cont’d.

[1] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fireworshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a religion.
Henry David Thoreau, “Civil Disobedience”

“How does it become a man to behave toward this American government to-day?” asked Henry David Thoreau in 1849. Just a few years earlier his answer was to disobey it. Arrested in 1846 for refusing to pay his poll tax because he refused to support a government that maintained slavery, Henry David Thoreau explained his thinking concerning the relationship of the citizen and their state in situations where the citizen could no longer support the state in good conscious in “Civil Disobedience.” Largely ignored until discovered by Mahatma Gandhi as a text that shared a lot of his own beliefs concerning political action and non-violent political power, the eloquent complexity of the essay also greatly influenced Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Thoreau wrote that “this people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people.”

Civil Disobedience
by Henry David Thoreau

I heartily accept the motto, “That government is best which governs least”; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe—“That government is best which governs not at all”; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which the will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure.

This American government—what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to his will. It is a sort of wooden gun to the people themselves. But it is not the less necessary for this; for the people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have. Governments show thus how successfully men can be imposed upon, even impose on themselves, for their own advantage. It is excellent, we must all allow. Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way. For government is an expedient, by which men would fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if they were not made of india-rubber, would never manage to bounce over obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and if one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads.

But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.

After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases can not be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which the majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience?—in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation on conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents on injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for the law is, that you may see a file of soldiers,
Democracy in America - 121 - Unit 4

col. n, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, ay, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? Visit the Navy Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts—a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniment, though it may be, "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note, As his corpse to the rampart we hurried; Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot O'er the grave where out hero was buried."

The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs; and yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others—as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders—serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as the rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. A very few—as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men—serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be "clay," and "stop a hole to keep the wind away," but leave that office to his dust at least:

"I am too high born to be propriety, To be a second at control, Or useful serving-man and instrument To any sovereign state throughout the world."

He who gives himself entirely to his fellow men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them in pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.

How does it become a man to behave toward the American government today? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave's government also.

All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of '75. If one were to tell me that this was a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counter-balance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty the more urgent is that fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army.

It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even to most enormous, wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If I devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man's shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. See what gross inconsistency is tolerated. I have heard some of my townsmen say, "I should like to have them order me out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico—see if I would go"; and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance, and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute. The soldier is applauded who refuses to serve in an unjust war by those who do not refuse to sustain the unjust government which makes the war; is applauded by those whose own act and authority he disregards and sets at naught; as if the state were penitent to that degree that it hired one to scourge it while it sinned, but not to that degree that it left off sinning for a moment. Thus, under the name of Order and Civil Government, we are all made at last to pay homage to and support our own meanness. After the first blush of sin comes its indifference; and from immoral it becomes, as it were, unmoral, and not quite unnecessary to that life which we have made.
The broadest and most prevalent error requires the most disinterested virtue to sustain it. The slight reproach to which the virtue of patriotism is commonly liable, the noble are most likely to incur. Those who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and support are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform. Some are petitioning the State to dissolve the Union, to disregard the requisitions of the President. Why do they not dissolve it themselves—the union between themselves and the State—and refuse to pay their quota into its treasury? Do not they stand in same relation to the State that the State does to the Union? And have not the same reasons prevented the State from resisting the Union which have prevented them from resisting the State?

How can a man be satisfied to entertain and opinion merely, and enjoy it? Is there any enjoyment in it, if his opinion is that he is aggrieved? If you are cheated out of a single dollar by your neighbor, you do not rest satisfied with knowing you are cheated, or with saying that you are cheated, or even with petitioning him to pay you your due; but you take effectual steps at once to obtain the full amount, and see to it that you are never cheated again. Action from principle, the perception and the performance of right, changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only divided States and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine.

Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men, generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to put out its faults, and do better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels?

One would think, that a deliberate and practical denial of its authority was the only offense never contemplated by its government; else, why has it not assigned its definite, its suitable and proportionate, penalty? If a man who has no property refuses but once to earn nine shillings for the State, he is put in prison for a period unlimited by any law that I know, and determined only by the discretion of those who put him there; but if he should steal ninety times nine shillings from the State, he is soon permitted to go at large again.

If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go: perchance it will wear smooth—certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.

As for adopting the ways of the State has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad. A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should be petitioning the Governor or the Legislature any more than it is theirs to petition me; and if they should not hear my petition, what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no way: its very Constitution is the evil. This may seem to be harsh and stubborn and unconciliatory; but it is to treat with the utmost kindness and consideration the only spirit that can appreciate or deserves it. So is all change for the better, like birth and death, which convulse the body.

I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one already.
Civil Disobedience, cont’d.

I meet this American government, or its representative, the State government, directly, and face to face, once a year—no more—in the person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly, Recognize me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the present posture of affairs, the indispensablist mode of treating with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and love for it, is to deny it then. My civil neighbor, the tax-gatherer, is the very man I have to deal with—for it is, after all, with men and not with parchment that I quarrel—and he has voluntarily chosen to be an agent of the government. How shall he ever know well that he is and does as an officer of the government, or as a man, until he is obliged to consider whether he will treat me, his neighbor, for whom he has respect, as a neighbor and well-disposed man, or as a maniac and disturber of the peace, and see if he can get over this obstruction to his neighborlines without a ruder and more impetuous thought or speech corresponding with his action. I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name—if ten honest men only—ay, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this co-partnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefore, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission. Reform keeps many scores of newspapers in its service, but not one man. If my esteemed neighbor, the State’s ambassador, who will devote his days to the settlement of the question of human rights in the Council Chamber, instead of being threatened with the prisons of Carolina, were to sit down the prisoner of Massachusetts, that State which is so anxious to foist the sin of slavery upon her sister—though at present she can discover only an act of inhospitality to be the ground of a quarrel with her—the Legislature would not wholly waive the subject of the following winter.

Under a government which imprisons unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place today, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less despondent spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race should find them; on that separate but more free and honorable ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her—the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, “But what shall I do?” my answer is, “If you really wish to do anything, resign your office.” When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned from office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now....

I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellow countrymen now. It is for no particular item in the tax bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man a musket to shoot one with—the dollar is innocent—but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make use and get what advantages of her I can, as is usual in such cases.

If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good.
Civil Disobedience, cont’d.

I believe that the State will soon be able to take all my work of this sort out of my hands, and then I shall be no better patriot than my fellow-countrymen. Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable, and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great many have described them; seen from a higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all?

However, the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world. If a man is thought-free, fancy-free, imagination-free, that which is not never for a long time appearing to be to him, unwise rulers or reformers cannot fatally interrupt him.

The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to—for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things even those who neither know nor can do so well—is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which I have also imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.