"I am writing a history of the world," [Miss Hampton] says. And the hands of the nurse are arrested for a moment; she looks down at this old woman.

"Well, my goodness," the nurse says. "That's quite a thing to be doing, isn't it?" And then she becomes busy again, she heaves and tucks and smooths—"Upsy a bit, dear, that's a good girl—then we'll get you a cup of tea."

A history of the world. To round things off. I may as well—no more nit-picking stuff about Napoleon, Tito, the battle of Edgehill, Hernando Cortez... The works, this dime. The whole triumphant murderous unstop—pable chute—from the mud to the stars, universal and particular, your story and mine. I'm equipped, I consider; eclecticism has always been my hallmark. That's what they've said, though it has been given other names. Claudia Hampton's range is ambitious, some might say imprudent: my enemies. Miss Hampton's bold conceptual sweep: my friends.

Penelope Lively, Moon Tiger (1987).

SO IT WAS for as long as any American academic can remember. While world history never quite vanished from the curriculum of universities and colleges, it was an illegitimate, unprofessional, and therefore foolish enterprise. It was for dilettantes. World history was abandoned as a scholarly project long before its evident Eurocentric biases became the subject of academic critique.¹ It fell victim to the relentless professionalization that this journal helped to foster. To be sure, there were a few scholars in every generation who were not easily contained by specialization and the objectivity it promised. They remained attracted to traditions of universalist thought and spun them out to considerable public acclaim.² More

² W. Warren Wagar, *Books in World History: A Guide for Teachers and Students* (Bloomington, Ind.,1973) ; Paul Costello, *World Historians and Their Goals: Twentieth Century Answers to Modernism* (De Kalb, Ill., 1993), is right to emphasize the anti-modernist turn of many world histories in the twentieth century. He points to: (a) Christian, especially Catholic, visions of a post-lapsarian world (Christopher Dawson) to which one might add Carroll Quigley, *The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis*, 2d edn. (Indianapolis, Ind., 1979); and Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York, 1966); (b) mythical revivals exemplified in the notion of a cyclical return (Arnold Toynbee), which resurface in a stunning critique of modernity in Robert Calasso, *The Ruins of Kash*, William Weaver and Stephen Sartarelli, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); (c) the idea of world unity modeled on a (medieval) ecumene (Pitirim A. Sorokin, Nikolai Berdiaiev) to which one might want to add a considerable list of Russian world historians concerned with Eurasia; (d) the powerful German and, for that matter, Spanish (Jose Ortega y Gasset) tradition that sets a "moral" Michael Geyer, Charles Bright "World History in a Global Age"

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important, a universalist horizon gave even the most circumscribed scholarship some depth and contemporary public relevance without which scholarship could not have flourished. But even in the heyday of progressivist universalism, the main current of social science scholarship and of historiography was anti-universalist.3 "Miss Hampton," the world historian, as portrayed by Penelope Lively, is in all respects a figure of condensation for academic professionals; she is the proverbial outsider—an unattached female, a writer, and a traveler of mixed fortunes.4

Despite the demise of world history as an academic discipline, powerful Western images of the world continued to flourish. In so many pictures, words, and concepts, the West—and its succession of actual and would-be hegemons—became the one civilization with both global ambitions and the wherewithal to realize them. A naturalized "imperial" feel for "the world" replaced world history. During the twentieth century, these world images had the qualities of the Cheshire cat, presences that lingered long after the actual body had vanished.5 World history ceased to be of scholarly concern, and once lively and contentious culture against the expansion of civilization (Oswald Spengler), to which one might add Louis R. Gottschalk, Loren C. MacKinney, and Earl H. Pritchard, The Foundations of the Modern World, 2 vols. (= History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development, vol. 4) (London, 1966). The common core of this tradition is explored in Karl Lowith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago, 1949); and subtly undercut by Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things before the Last, Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. (1969; Princeton, N.J., 1995). None of this accounts for efforts to theorize the expansion of (technical, material) civilization, which may be conceived as catastrophic (H. G. Wells) but may as well be optimistic, as much of the progressivist American tradition sees it; Charles A. Beard, ed., Whither Mankind: A Panorama of Modern Civilization (1928; Westport, Conn., 1972); Ernst A. Breslach, American Progressive History: An Experiment in Modernization (Chicago, 1993); Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New York, 1980). Contemporary exponents of this tradition (which requires a careful look at the German critique of a globalizing techne by Hans Freyer, Alfred Weber, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers among others) are William H. McNeill, A World History (New York» 1967), on the one hand and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vols. 1-3 (New York, 1974-89), on the other.

3 Typically, the special issue "The Historian and the World of the Twentieth Century," Daedalus, 100 (1971): 301-19, never mentions world history.

4 Lively, Moon Tiger, 1-2: " 'Was she someone?' enquires the nurse. Her shoes squeak on the shiny floor; the doctor's shoes crunch. 'I mean, the things she comes out with ...' And the doctor glances at his notes and says yes, she does seem to have been someone, evidently she's written books and newspaper articles and ... um ... been in the Middle East at one time ... typhoid, malaria ... unmarried (one miscarriage, one child he sees but does not say) ... yes, the records do suggest she was someone, probably."

5 Thomas C. Holt, "Race, Race-making, and the Writing of History," AHR, 100 (February 1995): 1-20, has pointed to the power of racial inscriptions in contemporary everyday practices. His approach may be taken as an example for an extensive and global literature on the subject The reconfiguration of European thought in the context of expansion has been the subject of Anthony Grafton (with April Shelford and Nancy Siraisi), New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), which elucidates the deep structure of European imaginaries that emerged from the remaking of biblical and Greek traditions in the transition to the modern age. More commonly, interpretations point to European discoveries, especially of the "New World," and their impact on European thought, such as Stephen Greenblatt, ed., New World Encounters (Berkeley, Calif., 1993); and Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago, 1991). Last but not least, Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1993), has pointed to the attractions of the aesthetic programs, while showing "the involvements of culture with expanding empires" (p. 7). The more common fare of Ideologiekritik is found in Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London, 1990).
universalist ideas—veritable "world pictures"—rotted into the commonplace platitudes and general prejudices that all reasonable historians had discarded. These traces of a world historical imagination, which continued as scholarly bias, notwithstanding claims of objectivity in narrating the history of civilizations, have in turn come under sustained attack, principally since Edward Said's brilliant and contentious evocation of Orientalism. This critique of Western images has itself become an academic industry of considerable magnitude.

Despite the abuses of historiographic fashions, this has had a liberating effect, especially in an emergent non-Western scholarship and for a growing number of scholars from East and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Yet there is no context within the world historical tradition to position these new histories, because world history, especially in its truncated form, has remained intimately linked to totalizing Western world images and stereotypes. The very act of mapping and thinking the world implicated historians from around the world in a nexus of histories of imperial power from which their "other" worlds and histories were either excluded entirely—subaltern to the point of nonexistence—or rendered subordinate. Saul Bellow's oft-quoted comment about the Zulus having no Shakespeare was meant to be maliciously evanescent but was in fact paradigmatic. The effortlessness with which Western world images prevailed and the exertion it took to escape them was (and is) scandalous, for while ever less thought went into imagining the world and historians abandoned the field of world history almost entirely, enough prejudicial world historical imagining was left to seriously inhibit scholarly efforts to retrieve the history of the world's pasts from the margins. These margins in turn came to resemble mountain redoubts, as non-Western and non-white historians fell back toward "local" histories as a site of contention, developing a veritable romance of the locality, politically charged as identity politics. The border zones between cultures, and explorations across cultures, turned into battlegrounds of difference.

Scholars in and of the West were no less stymied. Their century began with the expectation of a modem and thoroughly homogeneous world that would become one as a result of the expansion of the West and the consolidation of its power at the center of an integrated human experience. It ends with people asserting

8 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley, Calif, 1982).
9 Alan Liu, "Local Transcendence: Cultural Criticism, Postmodernism, and the Romanticism of Detail," Representations, 32 (1990): 75-113. This identity-producing power of the "local" is commonly studied as a politics of space—and it is not uncommonly (as in Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, or on the West Bank) practiced a politics of space, though rarely with the kind of emancipatory expectations that some scholars have come to associate with it. Despite his canonic stature in the debate, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans. (Oxford, 1991), knew better and is not one of them. While representing different disciplinary debates, others do express such emancipatory hopes: Edward H. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (New York, 1989); Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space (Oxford, 1991); Michael Keith and Steve Pile, eds., Place/Culture/Representation (London, 1993); Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Minneapolis, Minn, 1994).
difference and rejecting sameness around the world in a remarkable synchronicity that suggests, in fact, the high degree of global integration that has been achieved. What we have before us as contemporary history grates against the familiar explanatory strategies and analytic categories with which scholars have traditionally worked. These do not "add up" to a history of the world as we find it, nor do they any longer account for the patterns of difference that proliferate within it. This is a crisis, above all, of Western imaginings, but it poses profound challenges for any historian: the world we live in has come into its own as an integrated globe yet it lacks narration and has no history. Historians, like everyone else, must make do with narrative residues from previous eras—expectations of a unified world conventions of international relations and world-systems theory, paradigms that divide the world into the West and the rest, rich and poor, core and periphery and narratives that are framed in terms of national histories—all of which are rapidly being trumped by something very different. This "something" is not an exotic invasion; it is the world as it has come to be and now becomes history. World history at the end of the twentieth century must therefore begin with new imaginings. It cannot continue to announce principles of universality, as if the processes shaping the globe into a materially integrated totality have yet to happen. Global integration is a fact, now part of the historical record; but, because it has little to do with the normative universalism of Enlightenment intellectuals or with the principled particularisms of *tier-mondists*, nothing is gained by spinning out ideas about the westernization of the world or the authenticity of non-Western cultures. The effects of globalization are perplexing, but the world before us has a history to be explained.

THIS REIMAGINING OF THE WORLD as history is under way. In the past decade or so world history has become one of the fastest growing areas of teaching.\(^{11}\) More slowly and hesitantly, a body of scholarly writing has been emerging, branching out from the discontents of Western Civilization surveys and addressing world historical issues.\(^{12}\) While this turn, in part, may be explained by the economies of

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higher and secondary education (it is cheaper to hire one Third World generalist than five or six civilizations specialists) and, in part, may reflect the incandescence of the "world" on and for television, a nascent scholarship has set out to rethink the presence of all the world's pasts. It is still a hesitant and fledgling historiography, which remains mired in the old, unsure of its scholarly status, and with a tendency to service existing knowledge rather than create new knowledge. But a start has been made, and its impetus comes from many places, a great diversity of scholars, and a variety of disciplines. To present the world's pasts as history or more likely, as a braid of intertwined histories is, once again, a shared concern; and, while not yet a viable academic program, it emerges, if only in the most general terms, as the agenda for world history today.

There are many ways to approach this agenda, including the most venerable and by all counts still-prevalent one, which imitates creation histories and proceeds "from the muck to the stars." The most interesting advances in historiographic knowledge, however, fall into roughly two camps. One of them has developed out of grand civilizations studies, with William H. McNeill and Marshall Hodgson as its godfathers.13 While McNeill had a strongly materialist and developmentalist bias and Hodgson leaned, in the manner of his time, toward an essentialist history of civilizations, recent initiatives are mainly concerned with the comparative history of ancient and medieval empires.14 The proponents of this approach aim, ultimately, at a comparative history of power, with the wider issue of "civilization" (what it is and what it does) lingering uneasily in the background. Perhaps, intellectually, the most intriguing venue of this research derives from the rarely acknowledged queries of Canadian scholar and theorist Harold Innis into the nature of empire.15 One effect of this kind of history is to position the West in the


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context of the world, especially Asia—both its unexceptional history on a world historical scale and its truly exceptional late rise.\(^{16}\) The contemporary sequel of this history is the discussion of the rise and fall of great powers and the nature of large civilizational conflict in the manner of Friedrich Ratzel's and Karl Haushofer's geopolitics.\(^{17}\) The fact that this approach, as it focuses on the rise and fall of the American hegemon, promises also to historicize the United States, robbing this nation of its sublime presence as history entirely of and for itself, has made it a matter of political contention in historiographic debate but also a source of some fascination.\(^{18}\)

The other strand of world history is somewhat less well sorted out but has attracted an altogether more adventurous crowd of scholars from around the world. It has its origins in the histories of discovery, maritime empires, and nomadic formations—including, not least, the histories of forced and voluntary migration.\(^{19}\) It is a history of mobility and mobilization, of trade

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\(^{18}\) "Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History." *AHR*, 96 (October 1991): 1031-55 and (reply) 1068-72; Michael McGerr, "The Price of the New Transnational History," *ibid*, 1056-67. The assessment of the relative place of cultures, regions, and nations was the subject of Akira Iriye’s Presidential Address, "The Internationalization of History." *AHR*, 94 (February 1989): 1-10. This short but pathbreaking essay points beyond a too narrowly conceived debate on hegemony in international relations to the study of the multiple, often contradictory, and always uneven imbrication of international actors across cultures. In terms of scholarly strategy, it is similar to the work of ArJun Appadurai (see n. 23 below), even if their styles of thought do not mix easily


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and merchants, of migrants and diasporas, of travelers and communication. It is a history, ultimately, of rootlessness with the more general issue of "nomadism" or its maritime equivalent, "piracy," shadowing it. Key words for this history are "diaspora" and "borderlands." Both as the "privileged site for the articulation of [national] distinction" and as the site for hybrid and mixed identities, created at the crossroads of many histories. This history comes in many contemporary (Hong Kong Chinese, Indian, Jewish, Palestinian, Chicano, Asian-American, and Caribbean) as well as ancient (Hellenism, Inner Asia) or localist (Silesia, the Alsace, Michigan's Upper Peninsula) inflections. But in view of the cosmopolitan airs of diaspora scholarship, it must be said that this approach is also the most recent version of an old American dream that cherishes, against all parochialism, the moments of a new beginning and the freedom of movement and expression necessary to that end. It comes as no surprise that this history flows easily into contemporary literary concerns with diasporic cultures and into anthropological studies of hybrid spaces, as these are championed by scholars such as Homi Bhabha and Arjun Appadurai, the present avatars of an old Chicago

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21 In an imperfect world of scholarship, it is not Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940; Hong Kong, 1988), or his Studies in Frontier History (London, 1962), and his successors in Chinese Inner Asian Studies, but Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian Massumi, trans. (1972; Minneapolis, Minn., 1987), who have inspired much of the more spirited debate. Historians are mostly concerned with boundaries and national identities rather than the fluidity of in-between spaces. For Europe, see Peter Sahlin’s, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), page: 271. But there is a nascent literature (in all languages of the area) on borders and overlapping identities along the German, Polish, and Baltic boundaries. In U.S. history, see Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, 1987). On the loss of maritime imagination, see the photo essay by Allan Sekula, “Fish Story: Envisioning the Economics of Contemporary Maritime Spaces,” in Faye Ginsburg and Terry Smith, eds., Local World, Global Circuits (New York, forthcoming), as well as Sekula, Fiskhistoria (Essen, 1995). Among anthropologists, boundaries and liminal spaces have been a traditional concern, which has partly been reinvented by the influential essay of Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space3, Identity, and the Politics of Difference,” Cultural Anthropology, 7 (February 1992): 6-23; Victoria A. Goddard, et al., eds., The Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict (Oxford, 1994). Among literary scholars: Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands: The New Mestiza = La Frontera (San Francisco, 1987); Rey Chow, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies (Bloomington, Ind., 1993); and Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading between West and East (Minneapolis, 1991), are crucial.

A renewed interest in the histories of the world has thus found discrete subjects for study and teaching that can be expanded through time and space without—and, in fact, in deliberate and scholarly correction of—the biases of older world imaginings. It is a history that avoids the trap of setting one's own civilization against barbarisms everywhere else and deploys questions and frameworks in which “local” history can flourish while becoming more aware of its global historicity. As with any fledgling historiography, there are clumsy moments and unhelpful turns, but none of this should detract from the fact that a viable general history of the world’s pasts is in the making, and we may hope that, at the next centenary, many more essays on world history will have been published in this journal.

TO FURTHER THAT END, let the contention begin. The central challenge of a renewed world history at the end of the twentieth century is to narrate the world’s pasts in an age of globality. It is this condition of globality that facilitates the revival of world history and establishes its point of departure in the “actually existing” world of the late twentieth century. While this assertion may raise alarms about undue presentism, it will also dramatize the new situation historians face, which is neither the fulfillment of one particular history nor a compendium of all the world’s histories. World history in the late twentieth century must be concerned with these conditions of its own existence.

Presentism only becomes a serious danger if the history of our world is constructed ideologically, as if all previous history leads to the present condition. But the grand meta-narratives of Western world history, grounded in an Enlightenment vision of universal humanity and a nineteenth-century practice of comparative civilizations, ceased to produce explanations at precisely the moment that a global history became possible and a history of our own age and of the condition of globality is necessary. The project of universal history that sought to narrate the grand civilizations comparatively was always an implicit meditation on Western exceptionalism and, as the West moved (comparatively) “ahead,” a justification for Western domination. But it experienced increasing difficulty thinking beyond separate and “authentic” civilizations to the processes that were making a (new) world of sustained and deepening imbrication—that is, comprehending the kind of continuous and irreversible meshing of trajectories that dissolved autonomous civilizations and collapsed separate histories. World history, with Western history writ larger than others, did not turn out as the narrative prophesied, and historians, becoming perplexed by the present, turned away from the twentieth century and sought to make the early modern period look like the present ought to have looked if the teleologies of world history had worked out.

24 This was also the central thesis in Geoffrey Barraclough’s pathbreaking treatise An Introduction to Contemporary History (London, 1964).
26 This seems to us the major problem of world-systems theory as it was initially developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and since in an immense literature—most in opposition to the project A good example of the debate is Steve J. Stern, “Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean,” AHR, 93 (October 1988): 829-72 and (reply) 886-97; and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Comments on Stern's Critical Tests,” ibid., 873-87, which goes to show—and this is not putting it too crudely—that Wallerstein is quite wrong but that area specialists have no good idea what could possibly be “right.” Recent efforts to “universalize”—world systems have not really improved the concept See Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, cds., The World System: Five Hundred Years
or Five Thousand? (London, 1993). It seems to us that world-systems theory, much like the literature on "the rise" or
"the miracle" of the West, is infected by the problem of finding in the more distant past what did not quite happen in
the twentieth century, even though the West did emerge as the most powerful agent of globalization.
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This effort to get a running start on the present by going back in time amounted to a refusal to think about the world actually being made in the course of the twentieth century, and it has left us, at the end of that century, with no pivot of analysis and no way of narrating this century.

But, while the world as it is has been orphaned by the collapse of world historical narratives, this is not a loss that can be remedied by a more all-in, encyclopedic approach, as if equal time for all the world's histories will make history whole. Not only is a compendium of all histories likely to be bulky and unrepresentable, something historians find distasteful and open to error and sloppiness, but it misses the nature of the "break that constitutes world history in a global age. As such, it is compensatory history. World history in a global age proceeds differently. The recovery of the multiplicity of the world's pasts matters now more than ever, not for reasons of coverage but because, in a global age, the world's pasts are all simultaneously present, colliding, interacting, intermixing producing a collage of present histories that is surely not the history of a homogeneous global civilization. Much hinges on the ability of historians to effect this recovery archivally, analytically, and intellectually. But, in bringing out this history, it is important to realize that the condition of globality that characterizes our age is no more the sum of all pasts than it is the fulfillment of a special (Western) past. Indeed, if every past were for itself, and every history leaked over into its present, there would be no world history at all. It is precisely the rupture between the present condition of globality and its many possible pasts that gives the new world history its distinctive ground and poses the familiar historical questions, which do not, as yet, have clear answers: when and how was the history of our world, with its characteristic condition of accelerating integration and proliferating difference, torn off from the many histories of the world's pasts and set upon its separate course?

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27 This has been the position of L.S. Stavrianos, who saw the inclusion of the "other" as a source of optimism to counter the increasing gloom surrounding Western-centered narratives See The Promise of the Coming Dark Age (San Francisco, 1976); and Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age (New York, 1981).

HOW AND WHERE to launch a specifically twentieth-century world history that is neither an archaeology of comparative civilizations nor the history of one region’s past writ large? Academic debate in international relations would suggest that we begin with 1917 and make it a very short century of permanent crisis and contestations over world leadership, running through the two world wars and the ups and downs of the Cold War, ending with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the reunification of Europe in 1989-1990 or with the break-up of the USSR in 1991. This approach captures major aspects of twentieth-century development to be sure, but it also resumes a world centered on a European-Atlantic core (ignoring East Asian politics altogether) and ends in a triumphalism note that not only effaces continuing contestation over world politics but reaffirms the notion that, at the end of the twentieth century, the ”world revolution of westernization” is the only significant story. Thus advocates of a ”short” twentieth century converge with early modern specialists and world-systems theorists, who cannot start early enough and, turning their main attention to the emergent empires and the world economy of the Atlantic, treat the integration of the world as culmination of the long rise of the West. Both these perspectives on the twentieth century end up writing world history in terms of a single region, when in fact it is the imbrication of all regions into a world at once more integrated and more fragmented that constitutes the specific problematic of world history in a global age.

An alternative view, pioneered by critics of Western imperialism and theorists of dependency, would anchor twentieth-century world history in world-wide patterns of resistance against the imposition of Western rule. Nationalism and communism were the confluent currents of this program, and the (re) constitution of autonomy was its end. In linking the Soviet challenge (a ”Second World” break-out) with anti-colonial movements (a ”Third World” renewal), this approach sought to counter Eurocentric world with the assertion of subordinated peoples engaged in coordinated struggle.”

Yet this proved no more secure as a framework.

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29 Bruce Cumings, “The End of the Seventy-Years’ Crisis: Trilateralism and the New World Order,” in Meredith Woo-Cumings and Michael Loriaux, eds., Past as Prelude in the Making of a New World Order (Boulder, Colo., 1993), 9-32. This is also the position taken for quite different reasons by Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes.


31 The classic formulation is in Andre Gunder Frank, “The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology,” in Latin America Underdevelopment of Revolution? Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy (New York, 1969); Peter Worsley, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development (Chicago, 1984). James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, Conn., 1976); and Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, 1990), suggest a possible trajectory of these studies. While there are intrinsic (scholarly) challenges to this set of arguments (see n. 42), there is also what one might call a “reality adjustment,” which is only slowly followed by “paradigm shift.” In lieu of “localist” peasant uprisings, we find on the one hand (as in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia) “globalist” insurgences of groups that fit into a second economy of pillage and, on the other hand, ethnic politics that are keyed into world-wide networks of expatriate communities.
of world history than did Western triumphalism, and not simply because communism has collapsed and the nationalist project has fizzled. The century ends with the world being drawn together as never before but with peoples asserting difference and rejecting sameness on an unprecedented global scale. This is not a residuum of the past receding before a triumphant westernization, whatever the expectations that prevailed in the early 1980’s, but it is not a renewal of autonomy either, whatever the promises of the Iranian revolution. Rather, the recent waves of racism, nationalism, fundamentalism, and communalism register, in the context of an accelerated global integration, the continuing irreducibility of the “local.” Here lies a key to world history in the global age: for the progress of global integration and the attending struggles among would-be hegemons have persistently set loose contests over identity – or sovereignty, to use an old-fashioned but appropriate term – and for autonomy that, time and again, have renewed difference in the face of integration and thus continued to fragment the world even as it became one.

The history of world-wide contestations requires the perspectives of a “long” twentieth century. For as long as we continue to assume that the world is moving toward a homogeneous or westernized end, in which “traditional” and “other” societies take up modernizing paths toward a new global civilization, discrete regional histories are interesting only as a kind of “prehistory” specifying what went wrong with “others” and why the West won out. But once we acknowledge, reflecting on the conditions of the present world, that the processes of global integration have not homogenized the whole but produced continuing and

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32 The discussion on ethno-nationalism has yet to achieve the level of sophistication and historiographic depth that has come to characterize the debate on religious and especially Islamic renewals. A recent overview of the varieties of these efforts is Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley, Calif., 1993); but said Amir Arjomand, From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany, NY 1984), remains most useful. A good survey of divisive literature is Yvonne Y. Haddad, et. Al. The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography (New York, 1991). Key insights on this subject have emerged from the scholarly debate on Shi’ism in Iran. See the evolution of a field in Nikki R. Keddie, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500 (Berkeley, 1972); Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven, Conn., 1983); Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, Shi’ism and Social Protest (New Haven, 1986); and Keddie, ed., Debating Revolutions (New York, 1995). For a different set of interpretative strategies, see Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus, eds., Islam Politics, and Social Movements (Berkeley, 1988); or Said Amir Arjomand, ed., The Political Dimension of Religion (Albany, 1993).

ever-renewing contestations over the terms of global integration itself, then the histories of all regions (and their changing spatial, political, and cultural composition) become immediately relevant to world history—and not simply for reasons of equity or to establish the "essential" qualities of their civilizations but as actors and participants in the very processes being narrated. This history begins in the nineteenth century, more specifically in the grand transitions of the middle decades of that century.

Until that point, global development rested on a series of overlapping, interacting, but basically autonomous regions, each engaged in processes of self-organization and self-reproduction. This is a reality represented very successfully in the narrative and analytic conventions of comparative civilizations and empire studies. One would not want to discount the remarkable expansion of European-Atlantic maritime empires nor forget the deepening connections and interactions between regions, nor ultimately the growing role of European merchants manners, scholars, and especially soldiers in forging these interactions. But on a global scale and even within the maritime empires of the West, contacts between self-sustaining centers of power had more to do with keeping distance than with establishing relations. Contacts between regional centers extended relationally across space from one center to its margins and through physical (ocean and deserts) and social (nomadic and piratical) zones of transition to adjacent centers and distant others. Distance, hence space, remained crucial in governing the conduct of commerce and in the exercise of power. Moreover, on all sides, distance shaped global imaginings regional imaginary that went outward to envelop the world from distinct regional centers. Politically, economically, intellectually, and militarily, these patterns of regional autonomy, maintained by spatial distantiation and linked by specialized mediators and interlopers organized the world at least until the middle of the nineteenth century.

A dramatic and rapid alteration took place during the course of that century however. We cannot understand this transition if we focus exclusively on Europe or the surge of European and, for that matter, Japanese industrial and military power after mid-century, as undoubtedly important as these became. The crucial watershed inaugurating twentieth-century world history consisted in a series of parallel, simultaneous crises in the organization of power, production, and culture—that is, in the autonomous reproduction—of virtually every region of the world. A simple recitation of the wars and revolts that registered deeper systemic crises—the Taiping rebellion and civil war in China, which led to a revamping of imperial administration (and the regional breaking away of Japan toward industrialization), the Crimean War along the Eurasian seam, which led to a revamping of imperial administration (and the regional breaking away of Japan toward industrialization), the Crimean War along the Eurasian seam, which provoked regime crises in both the Russian and Ottoman empires.

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Poland and Egypt), the multi-layered revolt against British rule in India, the war of extermination against Paraguay in Latin America, the Civil War in the United States, the white and black (re) with regional breakaways in settlement wars in southern Africa, the crisis of the post-Napoleonic concert, and the spate of wars for national unification (Italy, Germany, Spain, and Serbia) in Europe—may seem a random selection. They were, above all, crises of regional power and stability, reflecting autonomous trajectories of development. There was no single cause or prime mover at work, for they arose from indigenous causes and had their own chronologies. What made these violent crises transitional for world history was that, in every case, they were played out in the context of deeper and more competitive interactions among regions, the competitive driven largely (but not exclusively) by more vigorous European interventions. The result everywhere was that solutions to regional crises came to involve not simply efforts at restoration or conservation but strategies of self-renewal and self-improvement: the famous Chinese Strategy of "adopting the ways of the barbarian in order to defeat the barbarian."

These interactions had "globalizing" effects. Solutions to regional crises involved a sustained recourse to interregional adaptations and appropriations. Regional development—that is, the self-preservation of imperial regimes—thus became predicated on quickly growing, interregional, and, quite literally, "globalizing" exchange, ending an era of self-sufficiency. Whether efforts at self-improvement succeeded or not, they began as proactive responses to specific regional crises, and they developed a competitive synchronicity that lifted regional interactions to a new global level, to a sustained, continuous, competitive, and often violent contact. The margins and peripheries that had assured distance evaporated, and the spaces between regions of once-autonomous development collapsed. Old ideas, expressed in the many ways of imagining the world, world space, and interregional relations across distance, gave way to new global imaginations. 36 Again, the difference is tangible though rarely explored. For this imagination saw every part of the world (including one's own) in its relationships to others, and all engaged in a dangerous game of mutual imbrication; and, while this nascent "global" imagination saw the world as an interconnected whole, it saw these connections differently from every vantage point. 37 In this way, processes of global integration were inaugurated, not simply by an expansionist Europe unilaterally superimposing itself on a passive world ripe for victimization but in a scramble of autonomous power centers, each struggling to mobilize its resources constitutes the rupture that marks the beginning of world history in a global age.

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36 This is the historical moment for what Roland Robertson describes as "global consciousness" in Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. We are rather more skeptical about the emergence of a global consciousness as a corollary to globalization and in this respect side with Janet Wolff, "The Global and the Specific: Reconciling Conflicting Theories of Culture," in Anthony D. King, ed., Culture, Globalization and the World-System (Binghamton, N.Y, 1991), 161-73. However/the absence of a universalist Welt/Geist (which, after all, is the idealist reference point of this debate) does not presume the absence of globality—not in the twentieth century.

37 Global imaginings aside, it is a longstanding debate in international relations whether the European system simply expanded or was pieced together anew in the process of globalization. We argue for the latter, which is why we think that the non-hegemonic, transitional periods in international relations (1840-1880 and 1980- ) are of crucial importance in understanding global development. The theory and history of international relations suffer from their single-minded concentration on hegemonic periods (1910-1960) and their pitfalls. A primer on this issue is Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford 1984)
THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION was not simply an acceleration along a continuum of European expansion but a new ordering of relations of domination and subordination among all regions of the world. This fact captures the revolutionizing quality of the European departure at mid-century. Unlike other regions in crisis at the mid-century passage, Europe alone resolved its regional crisis by turning outward, externalizing its quest for solutions in projections of power overseas, and it did so not by conquests in the old manner of empire building, through spatial expansion and occupation, but in a new effort, with new capabilities, to synchronize global time and coordinate interactions within the world.\footnote{This development—the metaphors matter here: this was no longer quite a "thrust" or "projection" of force but an exercise in "webbing" or "enveloping"—was sustained by new technologies, especially the telegraph and, later on, radio and telephones, but it was fully articulated in transnational regimes of power made possible by the formation of communications-based systems of control (the gold standard, the global deployment of maritime force, or the futures markets) that began to envelop the world in global circuits of power by the end of the century.} These systems of control, which proliferated throughout the long twentieth century, were the key that enabled a "new" European imperialism to exploit the self-improving strategies of all other regions, adapting the dynamics of competitive interaction among regions to move beyond mere extensions of power "over" others to the direct, sustained organization "of" others in global regimes of control. In this way, the European-Atlantic world became "the West" and gained its status as the centering axis of an integrating world.

As the dynamics of regional crisis drove Europe outward along externalizing paths, European initiatives collided, overlapped, and interacted with the dynamics of parallel crises in other regions and with strategies of competitive self-improvement that were devised to shore up

regional power and to fend off or contain external pressures. Historiographic attention focuses on East Asia, but elements of these struggles can be observed in the Indian, Persian, Arab, African, and Latin American worlds as well. As regional power centers moved to defend autonomy, Europeans found in these self-improvement efforts the pathways and the allies for further and deeper intervention. This was a profoundly disruptive, extremely violent, and often callous process, but it was never simply the plunder of compradors. Instead, Western expansionism picked up and amplified regional and local processes of self-mobilization, permeating and transforming them in the course of using them. The projections of Western power were thus locally articulated as self-mobilizations and absorbed into the very fabric of local flairs—causing wider ramifications of change, much of it beyond the view, let alone the control, of European powers, but also beginning processes of utterly dependent integration that deepened as self-improvement strategies took hold.41

Global integration was thus not a set of procedures devised in the West and superimposed on the rest as if a compliant world waited for its victimization, but, for this very reason, neither was global integration flatly or consistently rejected: Rather integration was carried forward, asymmetrically and unevenly, on a global scale. India and Egypt, as well as Argentina, China, Persia, and Africa, became victims of western expansionism and of outright aggression. But imperialism was also able to exist because Indians, Egyptians, Argentines, Chinese, Persians, and Africans helped make it happen, and not simply as lackeys and dupes but pursuing strategies of renewal that synchronized in the web of European-dominated global regimes. Running at full tilt

themselves, engaged Western power in complex patterns of collaboration and resistance, accommodation and cooptation, as they tried (often against great odds but also, we may add, with remarkable success) to reproduce and renew local worlds, using imperialists to shore up or to create positions of power, using sites of indigenous power to make deals, using the European and American positions as interlopers in order to selectively appropriate the ways of the conquerors to local ends. In this way, they were the ones to produce the resources for global integration, creating in the process a more integrated world, albeit not exactly as Western imperialists had intended. Global integration was built with this kind of labor.

The surpluses of this labor forged an ever tighter (if always competitive and contested) concentration of power within the West. That is, military power was projected everywhere, but nowhere was it more concentrated and lethal than within the European region. State power was extended as colonial regimes throughout Asia and Africa, even as state power became concentrated and coordinated in Europe. Western communication and transportation systems reached into every corner of the world, yet nowhere were the linkages denser or their impact more far-reaching than in the European-Atlantic region. Industrial goods were available and traded everywhere, but both trade and production were

most heavily concentrated and grew most rapidly in the core region. The intensification and concentration of capitalist production went hand in hand with its global extension, binding the world together in tighter, if always uneven and unequal, global circuits of power, capital, and culture.43


43 This at last, is an operating “world system” whose outlines just barely come into view—and whose polemical as well as scientific literature on the very phenomenon of world systems is part and parcel of its working. Both are discussed in Hobbsbawm, Age of Extremes. We have sketched out the operations of this hegemonic period in Michael Geyer and Michael Geyer, Charles Bright

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Within this integrating world, Europeans and Americans increasingly drew the lines of demarcation that defined an emergent global center over and against the rest. Global integration entailed a spatial reorganization of human and capital mobility that came to the fore in a rush of imperial imaginings by travelers, expatriates, civil servants, and armchair enthusiasts. These were elaborated into universal knowledge in a set of new imperial sciences: geography, ethnology, and biology being pioneer disciplines of the day. It was also toward the end of the nineteenth century that barriers were erected to control the movements of non-European peoples and a more rigid racial segregation was devised to define white privilege and to ensure control over racial "others," not only in colonial and semi-colonial environments but very much at the centers of power as well. Racism became deeply entrenched in legal, social, and cultural practices. This division of people underwrote a new global division of labor that separated, world-wide, capital-intensive industrial production from handicrafts and extraction, agriculture from industry, and was further reinforced by new procedures for allocating and controlling the movement of wealth, grounded in the international acceptance of the gold standard and of financial rules enforced, primarily, by the Bank of England. Across an integrating world, new lines of segregation and distinction were thus drawn and powerfully imagined in racialist world views that set the white European-Atlantic region and its dispersed settlements around the world apart from the rest and ensured their privilege.

The deepening chasms that divided an increasingly integrated world, together with the proliferating distinctions between "us" and "them" that were handed down as social sciences (modern/traditional, advanced/backward) and constituted Western discourse about the rest, swallowed up the older, enlightened imagination of "humanity" that had previously informed world history narratives As difference and distinction grew within an integrating world, the overarching simplicities of universal history were supplanted by naturalized histories of the rest—studied as the grand traditions of world civilizations in the humanities—and by a specialized and instrumental knowledge about progress-pursued as development and modernization theories in the social sciences. The West (in fact a few core European states, subsequently enlarged to a European-North Atlantic world and only belatedly extended to the Pacific rim) gained in this process a new intellectual identity as a discrete region. Europe was constituted as the West in the context of forging a unified, scientific narrative for an integrating


Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new edn. (New York, 1966), is one of the most powerful reminders of this universality of (Western) racism. However, her argument about South Africa is also one of the most troubling of the book, suggesting persistent difficulties of a powerful strand of Western political thought to address the subject of race and race-making (as Thomas Holt has called it) In Arendt’s case, this may well be not a matter of getting the facts wrong or of having incomplete information, as historians might suggest, but of getting the wrong "canon" in approaching the issue. Bonnie Honig, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory, 16 (1988)-77-98 In any case, the new separations were deftly captured by E. M. Forster in his novel A Passage to India (1924) and have been studied closely for South Africa by Charles van Onselen, "Race and Class in the South African Countryside: Cultural Osmosis and Social Relations in the Sharecropping Economy of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900-1950," AHR, 95 (February 1990): 99-123; and for Indonesia by AnnStoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31 (1989). George M. Fredrickson drew important distinctions between Jim Crow in the United States and the developing system of racial separation in South Africa, in White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York, 1981), but the centrality of racial demarcations in both systems between the 1890s and the 1940s remains salient. Joel Williamson explored the nexus of sexual imagery and racism in white imaginings in The Crucible of Race: Black/White Relations in the American South since Emancipation (New York, 1984).

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This was, one might add, a secular West that in the science of modernizing the world found a counter to and a strategy for surpassing its older religious identity as the site of (Latin) Christianity in juxtaposition, internally, to Judaism and, externally, to Islam. That Islam became a powerful and modernizing global imagination in its own right during the course of the long twentieth century (and not merely in the last two decades or so) is commonly forgotten.

The paradigm of global modernization was powerful knowledge with an unequivocal vision of the world to come. It underwrote a new narrative of world history, which left behind the pieties of Enlightenment thought. This history of a world being integrated predicted, first, that in dominating the world through its mastery of the technical and material means of global integration, the West would actually control the world and be able to shape the course of global development and, second, that in shaping the world, the West held secure knowledge, positive empirical proof in its own development, of the direction and outcome of world history. The world would become more like the West in a protracted process of modernization, and, as the rest of the world moved toward uplift and progress the division between "the West" and "the rest" would diminish.

IT DID NOT HAPPEN THIS WAY. First, efforts to establish global order proved notoriously unstable and short-lived. The two most powerful ventures, the pax britannica in the first half and the pax americana in the second half of the lone twentieth century, came and went quickly as world-ordering efforts. Neither was able to transform a staggering superiority in force into lasting political order—that is into a consensual global politics as opposed to domination and the threat of violence. This proved to be the single most abiding limitation on the West's ability to realize global control. Second, it did not happen this way because Western mastery of the powers of production and destruction (and of the scientific knowledge that underwrote it) never imparted a sure capacity to shape and mold the world into a homogeneous global civilization. What Western exertions produced instead was a disorderly world of proliferating difference, a world in which the very production of difference was lodged in the processes of globalization that the West had presumed to control. Even where difference was partially overcome by non-Western efforts to emulate and surpass Western productivity—a path taken by Japan and, later, others in the northeast Asian region, for examples—the power of the Western narrative, with its presumption of control and its racist exclusions, masked emergent dynamics of integration.

Thus not only did the destination remain cloudy but emergent realities in the global age ground powerfully against available images and expectations—creating a profound dissonance and

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proliferating fissures in the narration of the present. These are the signatures of accelerated times or, as Jacob Burckhardt called them, "world historical crises." This is, or should be, an exhilarating moment for historians, for it is now possible to set the res gestae of the origins of our actually existing world against the predictions and expectations of the past—no longer in order to announce the pending unification of the world or to criticize explanations and ideologies heretofore used but to account for the world as it is. Narrating world history in our global age means taking seriously (rather than fleeing from) the present. And it means recovering the spirit and intent of historical inquiry, as it is practiced in archival research, and adapting this to the task of writing contemporary history. For the basic operation of any modern Historik consists in teasing out the fissures and tensions between what happened (inasmuch as the sources allow us to tell) and what is said to have happened (in the lore, ideologies, imaginings, and general assumptions of contemporaries and memorialists). For modern historians, archival research is "investigative" practice. It is in applying these procedures to the present condition that we can begin to explore the question of endings.

There are many aspects of the contemporary world that offer examples of narrative fissure, where the course of events disrupted expectations. Examining how these reversals came about, how the emergent condition of globality grated against the expectations or desires of available world views, can give insight into key aspects of twentieth-century development and pose the crucial problems for closer study. We choose four paradigmatic arenas, partly to demonstrate the procedure but also to suggest the tensions that run through processes of globalization. Rather than seeing them strictly in a dialectic of "the global" and "the local," which belatedly has become quite fashionable, we would rather see these tensions as arising out of world-wide processes of unsettlement (the mobilization of peoples, things, ideas, and images and their diffusion in space and time) and out of the often desperate efforts both locally (by communities of various kinds) and globally (by regimes of varying composition and reach) to bring them under control or, as it were, to settle them. The outcome of these processes is a radically unequal but also radically de-centered world.

One of the most peculiar reversals of expectation that runs through the history of globalization concerns the expansion of industrial forms of production and destruction. The simultaneous process of diffusion and concentration of industrial capabilities was intimately associated with the project of subordinating the world to, and centering it on, the West. Integrating the rest into the economies of the West and subordinating non-Western warfare to Western command and control were key elements of modernization theory and of expectations about how global integration

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would proceed. Yet the diffusion of industrial production has actually eroded the boundaries of a
global division of labor that, at the beginning of the century, delineated centers and marked them off from peripheries. The spread of industrial production to enclaves and export platforms (as, for example in the Philippines) or the encapsulation of whole societies in processes of industrialization (as in the Republic of Korea) has, in recent years, shattered the fragile unity of the Third World. Rather than integrating regions and nations into a world economy of uplift, the progress of industrialization has re-segmented and re-divided the world, creating islands and belts of rapid and intense development beside productive wastelands—not just "out there" in Kinshasa, Dacca, or Rio de Janeiro but also in Liverpool, Detroit, and Los Angeles. Not only have these wastelands grown in tandem with expanding productivity, in a checkerboard of poverty and affluence, but the proceeds of industrialization, everywhere have been turned to the production of violence. Despite the enormous concentration of violence in the two world wars and the nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in this century, the proliferation of small wars and major massacres—and the general diffusion of violence not controlled by any center of power—has been unprecedented in our time. And again, these wars—occuring underneath, in between, and in conjunction with the grand confrontations—do not simply happen out there, in rickety "Third World nations" (and when they do, they produce industrial-scale violence, as in the Middle East), they also occur as "low-intensity" violence in the West, in the former Yugoslavia and the streets of North America. The mobilization of production and destruction thus turns out to be a globally unsettling process of unprecedented dimensions.

A second reversal of expectations concerns the constitution of regimes of order in a unifying world. At the beginning of the century, it seemed that empires would be the main agents of political order in the world and that corporate forms of capital would play analogous roles in ordering the world economy. The rivalry of empires set the rules of international relations, while the competition of monopoly forms, governed by the rules of the gold standard and subsequently by Bretton Woods, set the terms of survival for business. The notion of "great powers" and "global companies" assumed a centering of politics and economics in Western forms and practices and carried as well the undertone of an omniscient "brain" or "overmind" that understood and ordered the whole. None of this has survived the actual integration of the world. Instead of institutions that preside over the whole and guarantee a regime of order in the manner


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of secular universal monarchies, we face a proliferation of largely anonymous transnational practices, carried on in international organizations and networks of exchange, in banking and commerce, in information and communication, and, not least, in the interactions of states. The best scholarship on this matter coheres around metaphors of movement, flow, circuitry, following people, goods, and images in motion and seeking to specify the structural practices and imaginary "(land)scapes" that are created by and that sustain this movement. Thickets of rules and regulations, most of them instrumental and self-made, as well as institutional structures, hold the myriad of transactions together, but these are not centrally administered, nor do they have more than limited accountability. They have hardly any publicity. Organized in information corridors and segmented circuits or webs of exchange, these systems are difficult to describe, let alone theorize. While they are enormously powerful, they slip our conceptual grasp because they are so unlike the images associated with global forms of order and settlement at the beginning of our century. It is not world government but regimes of mostly private regulations and practices that maintain and service the process of globalization.

They may look brand-new, but, in fact, they have a history that accompanies the process of globalization from its beginning.

Migration, our third aspect of globalization, has also undergone dramatic reversals. The long twentieth century began with a massive out-migration of Europeans to the Americas, North and South, and in lesser numbers, to Africa, Asia, and Oceania. This movement was conceived both as an orderly expansion and as a way of maintaining order within Europe, because populations remained one of the most dynamic will into the nineteenth century. Such emigration was closely associated with efforts to organize the overseas world in ways that sealed off "native" populations in enclaves or compartments, where their reproduction served the extended family of Europeans. The global imaginings that were associated with these migratory processes have all

55 One might want to recall in this context Robert Maynard Hutchins, St. Thomas and the World State (Milwaukee, Wis., 1949); and more generally Oscar Handlin, One World: The Origins of an American Concept (Oxford, 1974); Wesley T. Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism since World War II (Bloomington, Ind., 1988).


59 The traditional interest in migration, especially among American historians, has focused on the “immigrant experience” and turned on the question of assimilation. Often engaged in debates over social mobility in the United States (Stephen Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians, Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-1970 [Cambridge, Mass., 1975]) and, in recent years, increasingly sensitive to complex transatlantic patterns of movement and counter-movement (see Mark Wyman, Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930 [Ithaca, N.Y., 1993]), this work has been fundamentally about white migration in the era of European expansion. Between 1800 and 1960, over 60 million Europeans were involved in intercontinental migration, mostly to the Americas and the Antipodes. While whites moved, however, non-whites were largely kept in place. In the same period,

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been dashed. Not only has the direction of migration been dramatically reversed, as the industrial nations become host to growing numbers of the world’s poor, but the gaps between the West and the rest, once established distance, are now transmogrified into transnational circuits of culture and exchange, wherein migrants move back and forth across borders (physically and by fax), keeping close touch with “home” and combining appropriated images and practices with a continuously renegotiated “authenticity.” This process, combined with the slow dismantling of regimes of ethnic and racial segregation in industrial societies such as South Africa and the United States, has led to the collapse of the once-policied compartments of cultures and contributed to the formation of what Carol Breckenridge has called crossover “public cultures”: new mass markets for consumption in which film, video, music, and sports spectacles become both contested and mediating terrains in the formation of communal and national identities. Again, the marketing of identities is not a new phenomenon. Moreover, its study has been ill-served by the single-minded concentration on the connection between the printing press and imagined communities, which is, as far as the twentieth century is concerned, an anachronistic assessment of what has happened. The fact that these markets are frequented by religious fundamentalists (the Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous audio tapes) as much as by secular capitalists (Coca-Cola), by producers of Hindu devotionals (with a huge market in East Africa), and by Brazilian, Mexican, or Taiwanese purveyors of soap operas (favorite pastimes in states of the former communist empire), as well as Hollywood conglomerates, should lay to rest the obsessive fear of homogeneity that has lately become a specialty of French intellectuals in their campaign against Americanization. These public spaces of identity have led to a certain euphoria, especially among younger generation of scholars. But if the balance of global development points toward an irreversible mixing of cultures and peoples, the cautious historian will also want to


The great chance of recent decades has been the accelerated movement of non-white poor peoples around the world, largely toward the industrial (white) regions but also, since 1973, to the Middle East and, more recently, Japan, seeking work and refuge. See Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, the Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World (London, 1993); Saskia Sassen, “Economic Internationalization: The New Migration in Japan and the United States,” International Migration, 31 (1993): 1-73; Goran Rystad, “Immigration History and the Future of International Migration,” International Migration Review, 26 (1992): 1168-99; Reginald T. Appleyard, ed., International Migration Today, Vol. 1: Trends and Prospects; Vol. 2: Emerging Issues (Paris, 1988). Because “host” countries remain deeply ambivalent, not to say outright hostile, to new immigrants and have moved to erect various legal and police obstacles to their coming, non-white migrants tend to live on sufferance, temporary visas, and conditional permits. And because their migration continues in the context of a steady globalization of production and communication, many guest workers, “illegal” aliens, temporary residents, and refugees, facing exclusion, maintain close ties with places of origin and with fellow travelers in other places. On these circuits, see Anthony H. Richmond, Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order (New York, 1994).


Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multicultural and the Media (London, 1994), is a remarkably circumspect survey of the emergent global media culture markets.

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recall the staggering costs in ethnic violence and genocide that have accompanied the recurring efforts to salvage purity and authenticity in the face of global unsettlement.\footnote{65} A final arena in which reversal of expectations helps illuminate patterns of globalization concerns the nation-state. Throughout the long twentieth-century, the world-wide mobilizations of peoples and resources and their channeling into transnational networks of exchange were effected by, and contained within, emergent state structures. States flourished in the context of globalization, a fact that must qualify much of the commonplace concern about global integration and transnational regimes threatening the integrity or autonomy of the state.

They did so because the condition of globality has always been organized locally, in one place after the other, according to particular circumstances and conditions that happen to obtain. No matter how powerful or abstract the networks of global exchange or how remote their nodes of control, each transaction needs articulation in some particular place, in some meaningful idiom, under specific circumstances, processes of globalization must come to ground in concrete social, cultural, and political contexts that move people to purposive ends and thus allow them, in some fashion, to represent themselves. In the twentieth century, states have sought, in their own interests and in the promotion of national development to negotiate these connections; indeed, it was the (relative) success of the state in managing the linkages with an integrating world that allowed "national" politics to flourish. This is why states have grown in tandem with globalization,\footnote{66} but it is also where powerful questions arise: for the process of global integration, while not destroying states, has had a tendency to bypass politics, short-circuit the formation of national agendas, and challenge the capacity of the state for political self-organization, that is, to constitute the nation and organize complex social relations.\footnote{67} The result of this development is not


only growing disillusionment with politics, world-wide, but the proliferation and strengthening of family and kinship networks and, more generally, of identity-based (ethnic or religious) communities as substitutes for national politics in much of the world. These go together with the proliferation of export platforms, para-states, "private" (family-based) states, and state satrapies. Here we find the key questions requiring closer examination for the whole of the long twentieth century—not in the collapse of the state but in the uncertainties of nations and in the crises of politics as popular representation.

By charting these reversals, in which the course of global development disrupts expectations and settled narratives, we find the crosscurrents and fissures that define the parameters of a century of global development. The processes of globalization have promoted social fragmentation and disassociation, just as the struggles to define community and defend it in the context of social dissolution have necessitated coming to terms with global integration. Increasingly over the course of the twentieth century, struggles for autonomy have turned into contestations over the terms of global integration—not over whether the world should move together but by whom and under what terms the identities of individuals, social groups, and entire societies should be defined. As this point is reached and passed again and again, the former center loses particularity; the more globalization proceeds, the less any region or society can pretend to control the struggle over the terms of integration. Thus we arrive at the end of the twentieth century in a global age, losing our capacity for narrating our histories in conventional ways, outward from one region, but gaining the ability to think world history, pragmatically and realistically, at the interstices of integrating circuits of globalizing networks of power and proliferating sites of localizing politics. This is the new condition of globality.

"THE INFINITE LIES OUTSIDE OF EXPERIENCE, and experience is the sphere of history." At the end of the twentieth century, we encounter, not a universalizing and single modernity but an integrated world of multiple and multiplying modernities. As far as world history is concerned, there is no universalizing spirit, no Weltgeist, to be re/presented working its way out in history.
There are, instead, many very specific, very material and pragmatic practices that await critical reflection and historical study. At the same time, there is no particular knowledge to be generalized or built up from these discrete practices into a general theory or global paradigm. Rather, there is general and global knowledge, actually in operation, that requires particularization to the local and human scale. Fundamentally, then, our basic strategies of historical narration have to be rethought in order to make sense of practices and processes of global integration and local differentiation that have come into play. Lacking an imagination capable of articulating an integrated world of multiple modernities, globality is enveloped in an eerie silence, which, however, cannot mask its powerful effects; and contestations over the terms of globalization, lacking a language that can accommodate, even facilitate, difference, turn into implacably hostile rejections of otherness.

A reversal of this silence entails, above all, thinking and narrating the history of this existing world and how it has come about. This project must proceed with an understanding that, unlike the systems builders of the European past, who visualized the world and thought world history long before they could possibly experience the world as a whole, we contemporaries of the late twentieth century experience the world long before we know how to think it. The aim of this world history becomes a dual one: to shatter the silence surrounding global practices, by tracking them, describing them, and presenting them historically and, at the same time—recognizing with Georg Simmel that, in an integrated world, we encounter only more strangers—71—to facilitate public cultures as the free and equal marketplace of communication among the many voices of different histories and memories. The practice of world history in this conception does not refuse or jettison the findings of world-systems theories or of a comparative history of civilizations, inasmuch as they survive a rigorous critique and shed their respective nostalgias for autonomous regions and essentialist civilizations. But the practice of world history in a global age does reconfigure the field in which these paradigms are deployed. It proceeds from the recognition that the trajectory of this world cannot be extrapolated from anyone's particular past, because globality is without precedent in any one specific society, religion, or civilization—although it is not without precedent in more syncretistic ages and spaces.72 In recognizing that global development in the twentieth century has broken through all historiographic conventions, historians must attempt to find a representation of the world as the field of human contestation in which the histories of the world are mixed together, but societies and peoples are not thereby transformed into one, or even made more alike.

But here we confront a startling new condition: humanity, which has been the subject of world history for many centuries and civilizations, has now come into the purview of all human beings. This humanity is extremely polarized into rich and poor, powerful and powerless,

72 Modern European historians can thus learn a great deal from Averil Cameron, The Later Roman Empire, AD 284-430 (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).
vociferous and speechless, believers and non-believers. There are clusters of dense interaction and clusters of loose and distant encounters. There are liminal zones and there are areas of devastation—wastelands both in the actuality of the present moment and in lingering memory. This humanity, in short, does not form a single homogeneous civilization. But in an age of globality, the humanity that inhabits this world is no longer a universalizing image or a normative construct of what some civilization or some intellectuals would want the people of this earth to be. Neither is this humanity any longer a mere species or a natural condition. For the first time, we as human beings collectively constitute ourselves and, hence, are responsible for ourselves.

This condition of globality can no longer be represented by notions of earth/nature or cosmos/world picture, as has been the case in the past. Instead, this condition of globality is the integrated global space of human practice. As a consequence, humanity no longer comes into being through "thought." Rather, humanity gains existence in a multiplicity of discrete economic, social, cultural, and political activities. In the past, such humanity has been the dream of sages and philosophers and, not to be forgotten, of gods, but now it has become the daily work of human beings. This daily work needs imagination. To this end, world history makes explicit and visible—it traces—both practices of global regimes and the imbrication of local communities. Its task is to make transparent the lineaments of power, underpinned by information, that compress humanity into a single humankind. And it is to make accessible to all human beings the diverse human labors, splintered into so many particularities, that go into creating and maintaining this global condition. This conclusion underscores both the promise and the challenge of the twentieth century as an age of world historical transition—that, in forging a world in which "humanity" has become a pragmatic reality with a common destiny, we do not arrive at the end of history. World history — has just begun.

This is the starting point for an exchange between global history and environmental history. See William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Garden City, N.Y., 1976); Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, Conn., 1972); and Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe 900-1900 (New York, 1986), as older examples. The intellectual origins, temporary significance, and subsequent displacement of environmental history as well as its renewal in the present is remarkably similar to the ups and downs of world history and global studies. This holds true for the new departures as well: Kendall E. Bailes, ed., Environmental History: Critical Issues on Comparative Perspective (Lanham, Md., 1985); Donald Worster, ed., The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (New York, 1988); "A Round Table: Environmental History," Journal of American History, 76 (1990): 1087-1147 (with contributions by Donald Worster, Alfred W. Crosby, Richard White, Carolyn Merchant, William Cronon, and Stephen J. Pyne); Antoinette M. Mannion, Global Environmental Change: A Natural and Cultural Environmental History (Harlow, Essex, 1991).

A Century ago, John W. Burgess wrote in “Political Science and History,” AHR, 2 (April 1897): “When mankind shall have reached that fulness of experience which shall enable it to become completely conscious of itself, it may then be able to turn all of its knowledge into science, and history may then be said to have done its work” (p. 407). It now seems that the labors of human consciousness in a global age require historians more than ever, though their labors need to entail the kind of historiography that has dominated a passing age.

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